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as executor of the Estate of Dawn L. Leo; 
CLIFFORD J. MARCHION; 
DONNA MARCHION, 
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, 
                               Appellants 
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NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC OF DELAWARE, 
d/b/a Champion Mortgage Co Inc; 
GREAT AMERICAN ASSURANCE CO; 
WILLIS OF OHIO INC, d/b/a Loan Protector Insurance 
Services 
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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
District Court No. 3-17-cv-05839 
District Judge: The Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.    
 
This case is about force-placed insurance, sometimes 
called lender-placed insurance. When a property owner 
takes out a mortgage—or, as here, a reverse mortgage—
that person conveys an interest in real property as security 
for a loan. To safeguard that security, lenders often require 
borrowers to maintain hazard insurance that protects the 
property against natural disasters. If the borrower fails to 
maintain adequate coverage, the lender may itself buy 
insurance and then force the borrower to cover the cost. 
That’s what is meant by “force-placed” insurance. 
 
This case is also about the filed-rate doctrine. States 
regulate the insurance market to see that insurers don’t 
charge too much (lest they earn exorbitant profits), nor too 
little (lest they be rendered insolvent because of 
unanticipated claims), nor discriminate unfairly against 
certain consumers. So states generally require insurers 
issuing policies in their states to file rates they will charge 
with an administrative agency. And the filed-rate doctrine 
“forbids” an insurer from “charg[ing] rates . . . other than 
those properly filed with the appropriate . . . regulatory 
authority.” Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 
(1981). 
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The flipside of the filed-rate doctrine “provides that a 
rate filed with . . . a governing regulatory agency is 
unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by 
ratepayers.” Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 585 F.3d 
753, 763 (3d Cir. 2009); see also McCray v. Fid. Nat’l 
Title Ins. Co., 682 F.3d 229, 236-41 (3d Cir. 2012). And 
that’s true even when the insurance company “defraud[s] 
an administrative agency to obtain approval of a filed 
rate.” Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1494-95 
(11th Cir. 1992) (en banc); see also Square D Co. v. 
Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 415-
17 (1986) (holding the filed-rate doctrine bars antitrust 
claims); Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 
341 U.S. 246, 250-52 (1951) (applying the filed-rate 
doctrine when one party allegedly defrauded the other in a 
rate agreement filed with regulatory authorities); Keogh v. 
Chi. & Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 161-65 (1922) (holding the 
filed-rate doctrine foreclosed damages for fraudulently 
inflated shipping rates since the shipper had filed the 
inflated rates). The point is that “courts are ill-equipped to 
engage in the rate making process.” In re N.J. Title Ins. 
Litig., 683 F.3d 451, 457 (3d Cir. 2012). Any court that 
attempted to do so would inevitably introduce price 
discrimination into the market, since “victorious plaintiffs 
would wind up paying less than non-suing ratepayers.” Id. 
at 456 (quoting Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 
17, 21 (2d Cir. 1994)). In deference, then, to a state’s 
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delegation of rate-approval authority to an administrative 
agency, we stay out of the rate-reviewing business. 
 
In the matter before us, borrowers from New Jersey and 
North Carolina ask us to review the force-placed-
insurance rate charged by their reverse-mortgage lender, 
Nationstar Mortgage LLC. They allege Nationstar 
colluded with a hazard insurance company, Great 
American Assurance Company, and a hazard insurance 
agent, Willis of Ohio, Inc., to pocket kickbacks on force-
placed insurance policies. Specifically, the borrowers say 
Great American inflated the rate filed with state regulators 
so it and Willis could return a portion of the profits to 
Nationstar to induce Nationstar’s continued business. The 
upshot is that even though the borrowers concede they 
paid the rate on file with the appropriate state regulatory 
authorities, they claim they paid Nationstar more than 
Nationstar paid Great American and Willis. That, the 
borrowers contend, violates 
 
• the terms of their mortgages (or in the alternative, 
New Jersey law prohibiting unjust enrichment); 
• New Jersey’s implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing; 
• the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 56:8-1–56:8-20; 
• New Jersey law preventing tortious interference 
with a business relationship; 
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• the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601–1665 (TILA); and 
• the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 
(RICO). 
 
We must decide whether the filed-rate doctrine blocks 
these claims.1 The District Court held that it did, and 
dismissed the suit.2 The borrowers timely appealed. After 
reviewing de novo, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 154 
n.12 (3d Cir. 2019), we will affirm. Because the borrowers 
seek damages tied to an alleged overcharge baked-into a 
 
1 The borrowers do not dispute that New Jersey law 
apprehends the filed-rate doctrine to the same extent as 
federal law. See also In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., 683 F.3d 
at 459-60. So if the filed-rate doctrine thwarts their federal 
claims, it thwarts their state-law claims as well. 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over the federal 
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and could exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims under 
§ 1367. Because the borrowers styled this as a putative 
class action for over $5 million in damages, and because 
at least one borrower is a citizen of a state different from a 
defendant’s, the District Court also had jurisdiction over 
the state-law claims under § 1332(d)(2)(A). 
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rate filed with regulatory authorities, the filed-rate 
doctrine precludes their claims. 
 
*      *      * 
 
The borrowers argue our decision in Alston v. 
Countrywide Financial Corporation distinguished 
between “challenge[s]” to a lender’s “allegedly wrongful 
conduct” and challenges to “the reasonableness or 
propriety of the rate that triggered that conduct,” further 
concluding that “[i]t is absolutely clear that the filed rate 
doctrine simply does not apply” to the former. 585 F.3d at 
765. 
 
But Alston held no such thing. The Alston plaintiffs 
sought statutory damages for violations of a statutory 
right; unlike these borrowers, granting the Alston plaintiffs 
relief didn’t involve “pars[ing] or second guess[ing] 
rates.” Id. at 764. That’s why the filed-rate doctrine did not 
apply. 
 
Alston was a case about mortgage insurance, a type of 
policy that low-down-payment borrowers must 
traditionally buy to protect lenders from the increased risk 
of default associated with a smaller down payment. The 
Alston plaintiffs bought mortgage insurance from 
companies their lender referred, only to realize the lender 
backchanneled with those companies to assume some of 
the risk in exchange for some of the plaintiffs’ premiums. 
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See id. at 756-57. That, the plaintiffs alleged, violated their 
“statutory right” under the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act to “a real estate settlement free from 
unlawful kickbacks and unearned fees.” Id. at 755. And 
that, they claimed, entitled them to statutory treble 
damages under that Act. See id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 
2607(d)(2)). 
 
That focus on statutory damages allowed the Alston 
plaintiffs to dodge the filed-rate doctrine. See also Patel v. 
Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 904 F.3d 1314, 1327 n.8 
(11th Cir. 2018) (“Alston seems to be making the rather 
unremarkable point that the reach of the filed-rate doctrine 
can be circumscribed by legislation that confers to 
individuals a private right of action.”). Simply put, the 
Alston plaintiffs weren’t seeking damages tied to the 
amount of an alleged overcharge. 
 
In contrast, these borrowers do seek damages tied to the 
amount of an alleged overcharge: they seek damages 
caused by “unreasonably high force-placed insurance 
premiums.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 187, 193; accord id. ¶¶ 6, 105, 
117, 130, 141, 148, 168. By extension, they functionally 
challenge the reasonableness of rates filed with state 
regulators.3 
 
3 Perhaps recognizing this point, the borrowers argue that 
even if the filed-rate doctrine derails their RICO and state-
law claims, we should spare their TILA claim since that 
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Today, we reiterate that the filed-rate doctrine brooks 
no distinction between, on one hand, challenging a filed 
rate as unreasonable and, on the other hand, challenging 
an overcharge fraudulently included in a filed rate. We 
noted as much in In re New Jersey Title Insurance 
Litigation and its companion, McCray v. Fidelity National 
Title Insurance Co., and in AT&T Corporation v. JMC 
Telecommunications, LLC. In the first two cases, the filed-
rate doctrine stymied allegations that insurance companies 
“collectively set and charge[d] uniform and supra-
competitive rates,” and “embed[ded] within th[o]se . . . 
rates payoffs, kickbacks, and other charges that are 
unrelated to the issuance of [] insurance.” In re N.J. Title 
Ins. Litig., 683 F.3d at 454; see also McCray, 682 F.3d at 
234-35 (alleging insurance companies hoodwinked state 
regulators into approving rates “consist[ing] of costs 
unrelated to the issuance of title insurance, including 
kickbacks and other financial inducements title insurers 
 
statute contemplates “remedies that can be awarded 
without the need to assess the reasonableness of any filed 
rate.” Appellants’ Br. 33-37 (emphasis omitted). But they 
never made that argument to the District Court—despite 
filing a 120-page opposition to Nationstar, Great 
American, and Willis’ motions to dismiss based on the 
filed-rate doctrine. So they forfeited the argument; we will 
not consider it now. See United States v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 300 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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provide to title agents”). In AT&T, the filed-rate doctrine 
prevented a prepaid-telephone-card seller from bringing 
breach-of-contract and state-law fraud claims against 
AT&T after AT&T allegedly overcharged the seller based 
on a service agreement filed with regulators. See 470 F.3d 
525, 531-32, 534-35 (3d Cir. 2006). At bottom, each case 
stands for the proposition that “there is no fraud exception 
to the filed rate doctrine.” Id. at 535. 
 
These facts show why. The filed-rate doctrine seeks to 
“preserv[e] the exclusive role of . . . agencies in approving 
rates . . . by keeping courts out of the rate-making 
process.” In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., 683 F.3d at 455-56 
(omissions in original) (quoting Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 
138 F.3d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 1998)) (calling this the filed-rate 
doctrine’s “nonjusticiability strand”). Yet if we ruled for 
the borrowers, calculating damages would require 
determining how much we think they should have been 
charged for hazard insurance—a new, lower-than-filed-
rate price tethered only to our conception of an appropriate 
kickback-free rate.4 See also id. at 457 (denying plaintiffs’ 
 
4 That is true even though Nationstar—not the 
borrowers—pays the premium, since this 
“nonjusticiability principle does not rest on the plaintiff’s 
identity.” Patel, 904 F.3d at 1322 (noting “[e]ven non-
customers, for instance, cannot directly challenge a filed 
rate”); see also Rothstein v. Balboa Ins. Co., 794 F.3d 256, 
259 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding “a claim challenging a 
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claims since calculating damages “require[d] the District 
Court to determine the reasonable rate absent the alleged 
conspiracy—‘a function that . . . regulatory agencies are 
more competent to perform’” (omission in original) 
(quoting Marcus, 138 F.3d at 58)). 
 
And the borrowers’ suit confronts an even more 
formidable obstacle in the filed-rate doctrine’s other goal: 
“preventing” insurers “from engaging in price 
discrimination as between ratepayers.” Id. at 455-56 
(quoting Marcus, 138 F.3d at 58) (calling this the filed-
rate doctrine’s “nondiscrimination strand”). If we forced 
Nationstar to pay damages, we would be giving these 
borrowers a better price for force-placed insurance than 
other New Jersey and North Carolina borrowers using a 
different lender but still obtaining force-placed insurance 
from Great American. See also Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163 
(observing that allowing “damages resulting from the 
exaction of a[n inflated filed] rate” would, “like a rebate, 
operate to give [a plaintiff] a preference over his . . . 
competitors”).5 
 
regulator-approved rate is subject to the filed rate doctrine 
whether or not the rate is passed through an 
intermediary”). 
5 Considering this nondiscrimination principle further 
distinguishes this case from Alston: granting the Alston 
plaintiffs statutory damages didn’t precipitate any 
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Just as the In re New Jersey Title Insurance 
Litigation/McCray court refused to “subvert the authority 
of rate-setting bodies and undermine the regulatory 
regime” or to countenance “victorious plaintiffs . . . paying 
less than non-suing ratepayers,” we will not consider these 
borrowers’ claims. In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., 683 F.3d at 
456 (first quoting Sun City Taxpayers’ Ass’n v. Citizens 
Utils. Co., 45 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1995), then quoting 
Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 21). And other circuits agree. 
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a 
materially identical complaint—filed by the same 
attorneys who represent the borrowers here—because of 
the filed-rate doctrine. See Patel, 904 F.3d at 1326 (“The 
plain language of the complaint[] therefore shows that the 
plaintiffs are challenging the reasonableness of [their 
insurer]’s premiums; and since these premiums are based 
upon rates filed with state regulators, plaintiffs are directly 
attacking those rates as being unreasonable as well.”). The 
Second Circuit similarly applied the doctrine to strike a 
RICO claim alleging borrowers “were fraudulently 
overbilled” for force-placed insurance “because the [filed] 
rates they were charged did not reflect secret ‘rebates’ and 
‘kickbacks.’” Rothstein, 794 F.3d at 259; see also id. at 
262 (noting “it is squarely for the regulators to say what 
 
discrimination, since the relief didn’t impact the price they 
paid for mortgage insurance. See 585 F.3d at 764. 
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should or should not be included in a filed rate”). And the 
Eighth Circuit likewise held that the filed-rate doctrine 
prevents a RICO suit for damages relating to a fraudulent 
rate. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 492 
(8th Cir. 1992).6 
 
*      *      * 
 
 
6 Contrary to what the borrowers say, the Sixth Circuit 
does not disagree. In Williams v. Duke Energy 
International, Inc., that court confronted fraud allegations 
extrinsic to an agency-approved rate: A power company 
wanted state regulators to approve a proposed rate plan. 
But objections from several large customers threatened to 
sink the proposal. So the power company allegedly bribed 
the customers to drop their objections. See 681 F.3d 788, 
792-93 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit held that the 
filed-rate doctrine didn’t shield the power company from 
federal and state-law fraud claims since those claims 
“d[id] not concern the particular rate . . . but rather 
payments made outside of the rate scheme.” Id. at 797. In 
contrast, when the Sixth Circuit confronts fraud 
allegations intrinsic to a filed rate—like the borrowers’ 
allegations here—they apply the filed-rate doctrine. See, 
e.g., Brown v. Cassens Transp. Co., 675 F.3d 946, 955 (6th 
Cir. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Jackson v. 
Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 731 F.3d 556 (6th 
Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
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Once an insurance rate is filed with the appropriate 
regulatory body, we have no ability to effectively reduce 
it by awarding damages for an alleged overcharge: the 
filed-rate doctrine prevents courts from deciding whether 
the rate is unreasonable or fraudulently inflated. Because 
Great American filed this force-placed hazard insurance 
rate with the appropriate state agencies, the District Court 
properly dismissed claims alleging the rate was 
fraudulently inflated and seeking damages tied to the 
purported overcharge. We will affirm. 
 
 
 
 
  
